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STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Was the Industcial Commission's finding that Plaintiff
failed to demonstrate that she sustained injuries as the result of
a compensable industrial accident arbitrary and capricious?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case is an appeal from the decision of the Industrial
Commission of Utah denying Plaintiffs Motion for Review.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This action arises out of an incident which occurred on
Friday, May 3, 1985, At that time, Plaintiff was 25 years old and
worked at Sperry Corporation where her job was to pull computer
units out of the ovens, lift them, and place them on a conveyor
belt.

She had worked at that task for approximately six months.

R. 21-22.

On the day of the incident she was lifting a unit

weighing approxi- mately 30 pounds when she felt a tingling or
popping in her back.

R. 22, 41. At the time of her injury, she

was picking up the unit in the same way she normally did; she was
"just doing her daily job at work."

Nothing unusual occurred.

R. 30, 33.
Plaintiff reported the incident shortly afterwards, but
worked for the rest of the day.

The following Monday, she went to

the nurse's station at Sperry and was later examined by
Dr. Henderson.

R. 24.

other doctors.

Dr. Chester B. Powell examined her on August 6,

1985.

Plaintiff was later examined by several

He noted that "there is a significant disparity between

Ms, Herrera's complaints and any evidence clinically or by X-rays
of any real pathology."

R. 9-11.

(A copy of this letter is

included in the Addendum to this Brief.)
The Administrative Law Judge concluded in her Order of
November 27, 1985 that "G. Carmen Herrera has failed in her burden
to demonstrate that she sustained injuries as the result of a
compensable industrial accident on May 3, 1985, and her claim for
benefits should be denied."

The Administrative Law Judge's

Findings of Fact state in part that, "[t]here is nothing to take
her activity on that day out of the realm of what could be
considered usual and normal activities.

Under Applicant's

description, the same type of injury could have just as easily
occurred had she bent down to pick up a clothes basket or a bag of
groceries."

R. 90. The Industrial Commission denied Plaintiffs

Motion for Review and affirmed the Administrative Law Judge's
Order on January 2, 1986.

R. 103. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a

timely Petition for Review to this Court on January 29, 1986.
R.105.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
There is sufficient evidence in the record to support the
Industrial Commission's finding that Plaintiff did not suffer a
compensable industrial accident.

Moreover, there is a wealth of

authority, including one case with strikingly similar facts, which
support the Commission's finding of no accident in this case.
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE COMMISSION'S DECISION MUST BE "WHOLLY WITHOUT CAUSE"
TO PERMIT REVERSAL
The standard of review exercised by this Court in cases

appealing decisions of the Industrial Commission is well
established.

In Kaiser Steel Corporation v. Monfredi, 631 P.2d

888, 890 (Utah 1981) ("Monfredi"), this Court stated:
[i]t is apparent that this Court's function in
reviewing Commission findings of fact is a
strictly limited one in which the question is not
whether the Court agrees with the Commission's
findings or whether they are supported by the
preponderance of evidence. Instead, the
reviewing court's inquiry is whether the
Commission's findings are "arbitrary or
capricious," or "wholly without cause" or
contrary to the "one [inevitable] conclusion from
the evidence" or without "any substantial
evidence" to support them. Only then should the
Commission's findings be displaced.
631 P.2d at 890. This standard was reaffirmed in Sabo's Electronic
Service v. Sabo, 642 P.2d 722, 725 (Utah 1982).

Accord, Billings

Computer Corporation v. Tarango, 674 P.2d 104, 106 (Utah 1983);
Moyes, ex rel. Moyes v. State, 699 P.2d 748, 750 (Utah 1985)
(applying arbitrary and capricious standard); and Emery Mining
Corporation v. DeFriez, 694 P.2d 606, 608 (Utah 1984).
UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-1-84 (1953) permits the Supreme Court
to set aside a decision of the Commission only upon the following
grounds:

(1) that the Commission acted without or in excess of

its powers; or (2) that the findings of fact do not support the
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award.

In Blaine v. Industrial Commission, 700 P.2d 1084, 1086

(Utah 1985), the Court stated that "the Commission's findings are
not to be displaced in the absence of a showing that they are
arbitrary and capricious'1, and went on to state that:
If there is a reasonable basis for the
evidence (or lack of evidence) such that
reasonable minds acting fairly thereon could
remain unpersuaded, this Court does not upset the
determination made.
700 P.2d at 1086, quoting Martinsen v. W-M Insurance Agency, 606
P.2d 256 (Utah 1980) (footnotes omitted) (discussing the standard
for altering findings of fact) .
In summary, the issue in this case is very narrow; whether
the one inevitable conclusion of the evidence is that an accident
occurred.

If it is not, the Commission's finding must be affirmed.

In this case, Plaintiff allegedly suffered her injury while
performing her every-day tasks in exactly the same manner as she
always performed them.

She had no prior history of back trouble.

Nothing unusual occurred at the time of the so-called incident,
and Plaintiff was under no unusual stress.

Finally, there is

conflicting medical evidence as to whether Plaintiff's complaints
are evidenced by any real pathology.

Therefore, it is clear that

the Commission's finding of no compensable industrial accident is
not wholly without cause, and must be sustained under the standard
of review set forth by this Court.
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II.

NO CASES SUPPORT PLAINTIFF'S POSITION.
Since this Court's decisions in this area are numerous

and their results turn in large part upon the facts of each
individual case, it is helpful to differentiate between them
according to the procedural stance with which the Court was faced.
Of the cases cited in the Plaintiff's brief, only two involved an
attempt, as in this case, by an applicant to reverse the
Commission's denial of benefits, Carling v. Industrial Commission,
16 Utah 2d 260, 399 P.2d 202 (1965), and Schmidt v. Industrial
Commission, 617 P.2d 693 (Utah 1980) ("Schmidt").

In Carling, the

Court affirmed the denial of benefits on the basis that there was
M

a reasonable basis in the evidence to support the Commission's

conclusion that the Plaintiff's loss of hearing did not result
from a single incident, nor from an "accident" arising out of or
in the course of his employment." 399 P.2d at 204.

In Schmidt,

the Court reversed the Commission's finding of no accident. A
review of the case law reveals two other cases where employees
succeeded in having the Commission's denial of benefits reversed,
Giles v. Industrial Commission, 692 P.2d 743 (Utah 1984), and
Nuzum v. Roosendahl Construction and Mining Corp., 565 P.2d 1144
(Utah 1977).

However, each of those three cases is distinguish-

able from the present case on their facts.
In Giles, the administrative law judge's finding that
there had been a compensable accident was summarily reversed
without a hearing by the Industrial Commission.
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This Court

reversed the Commission and affirmed the administrative law
judge's original finding of an accident, noting that the
Plaintiff's detached retina occurred when he attempted to open his
delivery truck door which was so severely jammed that a power jack
was later required to open it.

The Court felt that this clearly

placed the event within its definition of accident as an "unanticipated, unintended occurrence different from what would normally
be expected to occur in the usual course of events." 692 P.2d at
746, quoting Monfredi, 631 P.2d at 890. The Court noted that:
Giles' injury, on the other hand, did not result from a
commonplace or usual incident. A badly jammed delivery
truck door is neither a commonplace occurrence nor one
liable to happen anywhere but work. Further, a jar to
the body resulting from an attempt to open that door is
not usual.
692 P.2d at 746.
In Nuzum, the Court reversed the Commission's denial of
death benefits to the surviving children of a worker who died of a
heart attack after repeatedly climbing the six feet in and out of
the cab of his truck.

The Court stressed that his multiple trips

in and out of the cab were necessitated by a mechanical defect in
the truck, which "put him to a greater exertion than normally
would have been required if the truck had been operating properly"
565 P.2d at 1146. Unlike Giles or Nuzum, the Plaintiff in this
case neither encountered any unusual situation, nor was required
to use any unusual exertion in performing the task which she
claims led to the injuries.
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The Schmidt case is distinguishable on several grounds.
In that case, the Plaintiff, who had a long history of back
disorders, injured his back in the course of his duties of
carrying steel which he cut to specified sizes.

The case appears

to be a forerunner of the "climax" rule applied in the Kaiser
Steel Corporation v. Monfredi, 631 P.2d 888 (Utah 1981)
(permitting recovery for injuries suffered as "climax" due
to exertion, stress, or other repetitive cause).

In the present

case, there is no evidence that the Plaintiff had any prior
history of back trouble, nor that the strain that allegedly
occurred on May 3th was the result of a "climax".

Secondly,

Schmidt seems to be heavily influenced by the statutory requirement that all cases be submitted to a medical panel.

That portion

of the law of the case has since been legislatively reversed by
the 1982 amendments to Utah Code Annotated § 35-1-77 (1953, as
amended).

It is not clear what the result in Schmidt would have

been if the Court had not felt that referral of medical aspects of
the case to a medical panel was mandatory under the Workmen's
Compensation statute.

Finally, it should be noted that Schmidt

was a 3 to 2 decision, with no one joining Justice Maughan in the
"main" opinion.

In some ways, Schmidt appears to be an anamoly

since the dissenters in it were in the majority in leading
Workmen's Compensation cases both and before and after Schmidt,
i.e., Farmer's Grain Cooperative v. Mason, 606 P.2d 237 (Utah
1980), and Sabo, 642 P.2d at 722.
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Conversely, a number of recent cases have affirmed
denials of compensation by the Commission, just as Defendants ask
the Court to do in this case.

See, e.g., Jones v. Ogden Auto

Body, 646 P.2d 703 (Utah 1982) (substantial evidence supported
finding of no accident); Moyes ex rel. Moyes v. State, 699 P.2d
748 (Utah 1985) (worker's accident was not a significant factor in
causing the injury); Blaine v. Industrial Commission, 700 P.2d
1084 (Utah 1985) (Plaintiff's complaint stemmed from psychological
problems and not from her industrial injury).
Finally, it is instructive to note that in all the cases
relied on below to determine that there was no accident in this
case, the Court reversed the Commission's award of benefits,
rather than merely affirming the Commission's denial of benefits,
as Defendants urge in this case.

Redman Warehousing Corporation

v. Industrial Commission, 22 Utah 2d 398, 454 P.2d 283 (Utah 1969)
("Redman"); Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.
Industrial Commission and Thurman, 590 P.2d 328 (Utah 1979)
("Thurman"); Farmer's Grain Cooperative v. Mason, 606 P.2d 237
(Utah 1980) ("Mason"); Sabo's Electronic Service v. Sabo, 642 P.2d
Utah 1982) ("Sabo"); and Billings Computer Corporation v. Tarango,
674 P.2d 104 (Utah 1983) ("Tarango").
III.

SABO DIRECTLY CONTROLS ON THE ISSUE OF ACCIDENT
AND REQUIRES AFFIRMING THE COMMISSION'S DECISION.
In Sabo's Electric Service v. Sabo, 642 P.2d 722 (Utah

1982), this Court reversed the Industrial Commission's award of

-8-

benefits, holding that its conclusion that an accident had
occurred was without any substantive support in the record.

The

facts in that case are strikingly similar to this one and that
decision should control the outcome in this case.

In Sabo, the

plaintiff injured his back while attempting to lift a box of clock
radios.

The Court stated that
[t]hough it is clear that the applicant was
engaged in his regular employment and that there
was an injury, we cannot find that there was an
accident in the sense contemplated by the
Workmen's Compensation Statutes.

642 P.2d at 724. The Court went on to state, M[t]he mere showing
of injury does not ipso facto mean that a compensable accident has
occurred." id., at 725. The Court discussed the Redman, Farmer's
Grain, and Thurman decisions (discussed below), and concluded that
"[i]t appears to be mere coincidence that defendant's injury or
malfunction occurred at work.
showing otherwise."

Defendant bears the burden of

642 P.2d at 726 (footnotes omitted).

In both

Sabo and the present case, the applicant's job required "a lot of
lifting", Sabo at 723, and the activities were "not unusual and
were not strenuous in any way . . . .

[The applicant] was doing

the same things that he frequently did in connection with his
employ- ment in loading boxes which usually required bending over
to pick them up.
past."

He had done the same thing many times in the

Sabo at 723-724 (quoting the administrative law judge's

findings).
The administrative law judge went on to state, in a passage which
could have easily been used in the findings in this case, that:
-9-

We cite the case of L.D.S. Church v. Thurman
[Utah, 590 P.2d 328 (1980)] and find here, as
found in that case, that "there is nothing in his
testimony that shows anything unusual about his
activities, that shows any unusual exertion or
strain or that shows any contact with objects or
a fall. There is simply nothing different about
his activities on the day in question than any
other such working day." It is obvious that the
back failure could have occurred at any time
while engaged in any activity on or off work
since our ordinary day to day activities require
us to bend over, turn, twist, and lift many times
and in many different ways.
642 P.2d at 724.
The record in this case makes it clear that the plaintiff
was doing everyday activities in her usual way at the time she
felt a sensation in her back.

R. 30.

Similarly, the

Administrative Law Judge's Findings of Fact, which were adopted by
the Industrial Commission, state:
Additionally, she (plaintiff) indicated very
clearly on the record that her normal procedure
in lifting the parts was to squat, lift, and
straighten and then turn to place them on the
conveyer belt. She testified that there was no
variation from this procedure on May 3, 1985.
There is nothing to take her activity on that day
out of the realm of what could be considered
usual and normal activities. Under applicant's
description, the same type of injury could have
just as easily occurred had she bent down to pick
up a clothes basket or bag of groceries.
R. 90.

The disposition of this case is controlled by the Court's

decision in Sabo, which was made under a much stricter standard of
review since there the Court reversed the Commission, and
therefore Commission's Order in this case should be affirmed.
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Plaintiff's Brief attempts to distinguish Sabo and other
cases such as Redman, Mason, and Thurman on the ground that there
was no finding of causation between the accident and the injury in
those cases while there was such a showing here.

This analysis

not only mischaracterizes the holdings of those cases, but is
inapplicable to this case in light of the lack of any finding of
causation.
A.

There Was No Finding of Causation In This Case.
The Administrative Law Judge's Findings of Facts, which

were adopted by the Industrial Commission, list the issues
presented as including (1) whether the applicant sustained
injuries as a result of a compensable industrial accident on
May 3, 1985, and (2) the cause or relationship of the incident to
the applicant's alleged injuries.

The findings then go on to

state that "Inasmuch as one of the above-listed issues is
dispositive of the others, the Administrative Law Judge will deal
only with the issue of whether the applicant sustained injuries as
a result of a compensable industrial accident."

R. 88.

Therefore,

by its own terms, the disposition by the Administrative Law Judge
and the Industrial Commission does not reach the issue of
causation on which plaintiff relies to distinguish Sabo.
Moreover, there is insufficient evidence in the record to
establish causation.

Plaintiff relies solely on the report of

Dr. Gene R. Smith, dated September 24, 1985, R. 48-50, which
states that:
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In answer to the question of causal relationship,
it would appear medically probable in my opinion,
that the lumbar disc problem in Karmen (sic)
Herrera was causally related to the lifting and
twisting of the 30-40 pound weights in her
occupation.
This is not conclusive since in Sabo, where the plaintiff maintains
there was no such causal relationship, the Court stated that:
There is nothing in the doctor's evaluation which
would justify a change from the initial decision
that no MaccidentM occurred. The mere fact that
defendant's impairment resulted (in th€> words of
Dr. Momberger) "entirely from the incident which
he alleges to" should not imply that a compensable accident has occurred, as defined in this
opinion.
642 P.2d at 726 (emphasis added).

In that case, the doctor's

evaluation seems to be much more strongly worded as to casuation
than in this case, but Plaintiff claims that although there was no
finding of causation in Sabo, there was such a "showing" in this

In any event, there is additional and contradictory
evidence in this case which casts doubt on both the physical basis
of applicant's complaints and on their source of origin.

In the

letter from Dr. Chester B. Powell to Dr. Mark V. Anderson, dated
August 10, 1985 (just over a month prior to Dr. Smith's letter),
R. 9-11, Doctor Powell states that:

"I think that there is a

significant disparity between Ms. Herrera's complaints and any
evidence clinically or by X-rays of any real pathology" and he
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goes on to indicate that there is a "probable psychophysiologic
reaction" in this case, and that "appropriate consultation would
be advisable" if time suggests that the psychophysiologic factor
is a large element in Ms. Herrera's discomfort.

Cf., Blaine v.

Industrial Commission, 700 P.2d 1084 (Utah 1985) (affirming a
denial of benefits for an applicant whose "complaints stem not
from the industrial injury, but from psychological problems."
P.2d at 1087).

700

If Sabo is not distinguishable on causation

grounds as suggested by Plaintiff, then it controls the outcome in
this case and requires affirming the Commission.
B.

An "Accident" in Cases Like This Requires an Unusual
Event or Exertion.
The definition of accident throughout all these cases is

well settled.

From Carling v. Industrial Commission on, the Court

has
consistently held that a finding of accident
hinges on "an unanticipated, unintended occurrence different from what would normally be
expected to occur in the usual course of events."
Emery Mining Corporation v. DeFrieze, 694 P.2d 606 at 608 (Utah
1984), quoting Carling, 399 P.2d at 203.
Except for the "climax" cases such as Kaiser Steel
Corporation v. Monfredi, 631 P.2d at 888, recent cases which have
affirmed awards of benefits stress some unusual event, or unusual
exertion by the applicant.

For example, in Champion Home Builders

v. Industrial Commission, 703 P.2d 306 (Utah 1985), the applicant
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suffered a perforated ulcer when lifting an "unusually heavy beam"
—

one which was usually carried by two people.

Similarly, in

Emery Mining Corporation v. DeFriez, 694 P.2d at 606, the Court in
a per curiam decision held that the applicant suffered a compensable accident when he injured his back while rapidly sliding out
of a crawlspace and twisting to stand up to avoid being sprayed
with hot oil.

In Frito-Lay Inc. v. Jacobs, 689 P.2d 1335 (Utah

1985), the Court upheld benefits awarded for the applicant's back
injury which occurred as he was loading Cheetos onto his truck.
The Court noted that it was an unusual occurrence, because usually
he hand-loaded the truck, but due to the large amount of product
in this instance he was using a dolly, which directly led to the
accident.

Similarly, in IGA Food Fair v. Martin, 584 P.2d 828

(Utah 1978), the Court affirmed the Commission's finding that the
injury had resulted from an "extraordinary exertion in the course
of his work which produced an unusual and unanticipated result and
thus comes within the definition of an accident."
(emphasis added).

Id.,

at 830

In Pittsburg Testing Laboratory v. Keller, 657

P.2d 1367 (Utah 1983), the Court affirmed the award of death
benefits where the decedent had a heart attack following working
inside an extremely hot (100 to 125°F) building.
On the other hand, the Court has continued to reverse
awards of benefits if the applicant fails to meet his burden of
showing the occurrence of an accident.

See, Billings Computer

Corporation v. Tarango, 674 P.2d 104 (Utah 1983).
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In that case

the applicant injured her knee when she knelt down to pick up some
small items off the floor.

The Court quoted extensively from

Sabo, and stated:
The circumstances which precipitated her
injury were in no way unusual or accidental, as
that term is explained above. As noted
previously, her testimony of these events is that
she knelt down in the normal and usual way and
that she did not fall and strike her knee on the
floor, but rather placed it on the floor without
abrupt contact. In light of these facts, we
conclude that Mrs. Tarango did not meet her
burden of showing a compensable accident and that
the Industrial Commission's conclusion to that
effect was "contrary to the 'one [inevitable]
conclusion from the evidence.'" We therefore
vacate the Commission's order and award of
benefits.
674 P.2d at 107 quoting from Monfredi, 631 P.2d at 888. Similarly,
in this case the plaintiff has failed to establish that the
circumstances which precipitated her injury were in any way
unusual or "accidental" and therefore, she did not meet her burden
of showing a compensable accident.
C.

The Decisions in Sabo, et al., Turn Upon the Finding
of "No Accident", Rather Than a Lack of Causation.
As stated above, plaintiff attempts to distinguish Sabo

by asserting that the decision there and those in Redman, Mason,
and Thurman turn upon a lack of causation between the injury and
the accident.

A more careful reading of the cases indicates that

in each of those cases the Court determined that no compensable
accident occurred, just as the Commission found in this case.
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While it is difficult to separate the question of the accident's
existence from the question of causation, the case law clearly
indicates that the analysis is a two-step process.
P.2d at 695; Sabo, 642 P.2d

at 725.

Schmidt, 612

It is equally clear that it

is the Commission's responsibility to make findings of fact such
as the existence of the accident.

See, e.g., U.S. Steel

Corporation v. Industrial Commission, 607 P.2d 807 (Utah 1980);
Emery Mining Corporation v. DeFriez, 694 P.2d 606, 608 (Utah 1984)
("A finding of accident . . . is primarily a factual question best
left to the Commission."); Sabo, 642 P.2d at 725.
Rather than turning on a finding of no causation, as
claimed by Plaintiff, the Court in Redman, where the applicant
suffered a herniated disc while driving a truck, stated:
[t]here is nothing in this record that shows any
unusual event or 'accident' if you please,
justifying compensability within the nature,
intent or spirit of the Workmen's Compensation
Act.
454 P.2d at 285 (reversing the Commission's award of benefits).
In Thurman the Court also reversed an award of benefits.
It quoted extensively from Redman and stated:
The evidence does not support the Industrial
Commission's conclusion that an "accident" had
arisen out of or in the course of Thurman's
employment.
590 P.2d at 330.

In that case, the applicant experienced pain in
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his back upon standing to answer a telephone.

Similarly, in

Mason, the Court reversed an award of benefits, stating that Mthe
record before us does not support the Commission's conclusion that
an accident arose out of or in the course of defendant's
employment," 606 P.2d at 240, where the applicant injured his back
while unloading 100-pound bags from his truck.

As discussed

above, the Sabo Court held that "the Commission's conclusion that
an accident occurred is without any substantive support in the
record."

642 P.2d at 726.

In that case, the applicant was merely

picking up a box of clock radios in the usual way in the course of
his employment.
To the extent causation is a factor in the decisions in
these cases, the proposition they stand for was well stated in
Kennecott Corporation v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 675 P.2d
1187, 1191 (Utah 1983):
The general rule concerning causation is that an
employee cannot recover for a physiological
malfunction which is not job-induced and which
could have happened as easily away from work as
at work.
In that case the Court affirmed the award of death benefits to an
employee's widow based on the idiopathic fall doctrine, which has
no application here.

The Findings of Fact in this case expressly

state that:
There is nothing to take her activity on that day
out of the realm of what could be considered
usual and normal activities . . . the same type
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of injury could have just as easily occurred had
she bent down to pick up a clothes basket or bag
of groceries.
R. 90. The facts in this case clearly show that there was no
unusual exertion or occurrence and that Plaintiff's malfunction
would have just as easily happened away from work.

Nor do the

facts demand the conclusion that her malfunction was job-induced.
D.

The Definition of Accident as Interpreted in Sabo is
Supported by Strong Policy Considerations and Should Not
be Discarded.
This case is so closely governed by existing precedent,

that to reverse the Commission would require overturning Sabo and
the other cases discussed above which require the showing of an
identifiable accident under circumstances such as those present in
this case.

Plaintiff's brief appears to indirectly request this

result since it argues that Utah is in the minority position on
this issue. Aside from the obvious problems with stare decisis
such a decision would incur, the present definition of accident
serves significant policy goals which have been well articulated
by the Court.

In Mason, the Court stated:

It is also to be observed, that should the
determination of the Commission be left to stand
(i.e., award of benefits to applicant whose back
was injured while unloading bags of whey), its
practical effect would be to severely limit the
employment prospects of those in the work-force
who have existing physical limitations.
Employers would simply be apt to refuse
employment to those so afflicted rather than to
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run the risk of having to bear the cost of
compensation for non-accident oriented
disabilities that may occur.
606 P.2d at 240; see also, Redman, 454 P.2d at 285.
To allow compensation in situations such as this where
there is no preexisting injury and no identifiable accident would
effectively change the impact of the Workmen's Compensation
Statute.

Its purpose has been to alter the common law tort rights

between employers and employees for work-related injuries to
permit the employee rapid, inexpensive recovery for them and to
allow the employer to limit its total liability for such injuries.
A broader definition of accident would effectively make employers
insurers for all physiological malfunctions which happen to occur
when the employee is at work.

Redman, 454 P.2d at 285. While

this may encourage people to work longer hours so that they may be
covered if they develop a health problem while at work, it is more
likely that the change will impose significant financial obligations on employers and cause discrimination against otherwise
productive employees who have preexisting internal weaknesses.
The "leading case" that petitioner relies upon for
reversal is Purity Biscuit Company v. Industrial Commission, 115
Utah 1, 201 P.2d 961 (1949).
repeatedly critized.

That case, however, has been

In Redman, the Court stated that it

has been a nub of contention in legal circles,
but in its 20 year lifespan it has not been
overruled apodictically, nor given nourishment by
an approbation. Purity enjoys a unique and
doubtful distinction of being a living corpse.
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454 P.2d at 286.

Similarly, in Mellen v. Industrial Commission,

19 Utah 2d 373, 431 P.2d 798 (1967), the Court noted that it was
"another 3 to 2 decision, which, decided in 1949, 18 years ago, in
a long, difficult to understand opinion, which has never been
cited by this Court or any other Court to support the law of that
case. . . .

The Purity Biscuit case certainly needs a healthy

reappraisement. "

Id.

at 799-800.

While Purity may have seemed revived in Schmidt, 617 P.2d
at 693, Schmidt, as discussed above, stands on its own and is
distinguishable from this action.
this Court since Schmidt.

Purity has not been cited by

To resuscitate Purity the Court would

have to repudiate its modern line of cases, including Sabo,
Tarango, Mason, and Thurman.

Respondent urges that the Court

retain some meaning in the term "accident" in cases such as this
and not permit employees to recover based on the "mere coincidence
that (plaintiff's) injury or malfunction occurred at work."

Sabo,

642 P.2d at 726.

CONCLUSION
The Commission's finding of no accident in this case,
where the Plaintiff's injury occurred while performing her
ordinary tasks in her usual manner, in the absence of any
preexisting problem, or any unusual stress or exertion, is not
arbitrary or capricious.

Clearly, reasonable minds would not be

driven to the "one [inevitable] conclusion from the evidence" that
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an accident occurred.

Accordingly, defendants request this Court

affirm the decision of the Industrial Commission.
Dated this /i""/<"day of May, 1986.
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER

Thomas L. Kay S
Steven J. Aeschbacher
Attorneys for DefendantsRespondents
SJA+6
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the /S^

day of May, 1986, four

(4) true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of Respondents
Sperry Corporation and Travelers Insurance Company were mailed,
postage prepaid, to each of the following:
Denton M. Hatch
Wesley M. Lang
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN k POWELL
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant
900 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Erie Boorman, Administrator
Second Injury Fund
Industrial Commission of Utah
160 East 300 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Stephen M. Hadley
Industrial Commission of Utah
160 East 300 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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A D D E N D U M

ROBERTS HOOD. MD
THOMAS J MIMS. M D

975 EAST FIRST SOUTH
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84102
DIAL (801) 531-7806

~

CONSULTANT

M PETER HEILBRUN. M D
THEODORE S ROBERTS. M D

August 10, 1985

Mark V. Anderson, M.D.
2020 West 2200 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84119

RE:
Dear Doctor Anderson:

£ . Carmen Herrera
Enp: Sperry llnivac
D/I: May 6, 1985

Ms. Herrera, age 25, a test specialist for Sperry Corp. was seen at
your request August 6 for neurosurgical evaluation with persistent
symptoms three months following low back stress:
1. "My buttocks hurt.
2. Low back ache.
3. Upper back ache, headaches and I hurt all over."
History:
Ms. Herrera, who denies prior problems, states that on May 6; at work
she was "lifting a computer unit that weighs about 25 lbs. and coming
up after I picked it up felt a tingling and snap in my back". She
was able to finish the day but the next day was sufficiently uncomfortable that she saw you, had X-rays and a CT scan and has been
treated with physical therapy and anti-inflammatory medication. She
reports an initial improvement which was slow and thereafter her condition stabilized with these persistent complaints:
Low back and buttocks - Her chief discomfort with a feeling of
"bruised and pressure". More comfortable lying on her side
with a pillow between her knees. Symptoms aggravated by walking,
standing, bending over or sitting or walking up stairs. Sneezing
hurts in the back.
Left hip - Painful.
Upper back - "Feels bruised".
Headaches - Indicates right side behind the eye and in the occiput
with numbness and pain in the back of the neck.
These symptoms are fairly constant but she feels have "leveled off and/
or may.be worse". She attempted to return to work but was released,
there being no duty not requiring lifting. She says she is depressed.
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Mark V. Anderson, M.u.
August 10, 1985
RE:

G. Carmen Herrera

Your duplicates records are appreciated and noted.
denial of industrial liability.

Included is a

Past History:
Denies any medical problems or other significant trauma. Has had surgical
reduction of a left hip dislocation and repair of ligamentous injury in
the left knee and removal of a bone chip in the left foot. Familial
background reviewed is negative. Inquiry by systems discloses no other
problems. Patient has seasonal hayfever and becomes nauseated with
Codeine.
Examination:
B'S", 137 lbs., a non-obese, healthy appearing, young woman in no evident physical distress.
Physical Examination: Posture and gait are normal and there is a
good range of lumbar mobility. Skin is normal except for surgical
scars, peripheral pulses and joints normal. CHest and abdomen WNL.
Neurologic Examination: Cranial nerves intact. Upper extremities
symmetrically normal. In lower extremities strength and sensation
are normal. Reflexes are sluggish but equal except that the left
ankle jerk may be relatively diminished. Sciatic stretch sign
is negative while straight leg elevation aggravates low back discomfort.
Supplemental Data and Comment:
X-rays, 5-10-85, were reviewed:
Lumbar spine - Normal.
CT - Normal. Dr. Brinton's report, however, indicates question
of lumbosacral level on the right but in the absence of the loss
of epidural fat or evident displacement of nerve root or dural
sac, I think this is speculative.
I think there is a significant disparity between Ms. Herrera's complaints
and any evidence clinically or by X-rays of any real pathology. At
most I would feel she sustained a low back strain and I think the symptoms are probably functionally accentuated.
All I could recommend is continuing on a conservative basis with physical therapy, anti-inflammatory and muscle relaxant medication, simple
analgesics and continued observation in the event more specific symptoms and/or some objective clinical changes appear. In that event I
think a myelogram would be desirable for hard, objective evidence, before
considering intervention.
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RE: 6. Carmen Herrera
If time suggests that the psychophysiologic factor is a large element,
then appropriate consultation would be advisable.
Impression:
1. History of low back stress sustained incident to lifting 5-6-85
with:
a. Persistent low back discomfort with radiation.
b. Various subjective discomforts.
c. Without objective clinical or X-ray evidence of
specific pathology.
2. Probable psychophysiologic reaction.
Thanks for the opportunity of seeing Ms. Herrera.
Cordially,

a

H$fc

Chester B. Powell, M.D.
CBP:cw

ccr^The Travelers Insurance
Utah Industrial Ocnmission

D:
T:

8-7-85
8-10-85
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